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Abstract
This paper conducts an operational analysis of legacy and future mine warfare systems using discrete event simulation.
The research focuses on a comparative analysis of the MCM-1 Avenger ship, supported by the MH-53E helicopter, and
the Littoral Combat Ship, supported by external unmanned systems, in active, defense mine countermeasures opera-
tions. The paper develops architectural representations of the functional activities associated with mine countermea-
sures operations, as well as architectural representations of past, current, and potential future physical entities involved
in minehunting and mine neutralization. Those architectural representations are used as the basis for the development
of two distinct discrete event simulation models, one corresponding to legacy (MCM-1 Avenger) operations and another
corresponding to future (Littoral Combat Ship) operations. The results of the simulation are analyzed using statistical
regression. The regression results indicate that the key performance drivers for both the legacy and future systems show
considerable overlap, and also suggest that the legacy assets meet or exceed the performance of future assets in several
measures of effectiveness. The simulation model for the future assets is reconsidered to develop recommendations
regarding alterations to the future force that enable the future force to exceed the operational performance of the
legacy force.
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1. Introduction
On 24 March 2016 the United States Navy formally can-
celled the Remote Minehunting System (RMS) component
of the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Mine Countermeasures
(MCM) mission package (MP).1 This followed an in-depth
review, initiated on 25 September 2015 of the RMS.2 The
additional review assessed the requirements and technolo-
gical readiness of the RMS. While this additional review
found that the technological deficiencies of the RMS
precluded further acquisition plans, it is also useful to con-
duct an in-depth analytical comparison of the operational
effectiveness of the LCS and RMS to the legacy assets that
these systems are intended to replace—the MCM-1
Avenger.
The LCS, supported by the RMS, was originally
expected to completely phase out the MCM-1 Avenger by
2025.3 This timeline was based on confidence in the tech-
nological feasibility of the RMS (and a general interest in
unmanned systems) as well as an increased operational
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emphasis on removing sailors from the minefield during
minehunting operations. Amador3 provides a visualization
of the gradual nature of the phased nature of the shift from
the MCM-1 to the LCS.
Note that while Amador3 suggests that there is a near
one-to-one relationship between the operational perfor-
mance of the LCS and the MCM-1, this is not strictly true.
In fact, the MCM mission package of the LCS was to be
delivered in three increments, with each increment adding
additional systems and capabilities. Further, the introduc-
tion of the LCS MCM mission packages do not map
directly to the decommissioning of the MCM-1 Avenger.
To better understand the consequences of this transition,
this paper presents an operational effectiveness analysis
comparing the MCM-1 Avenger to the LCS MCM mission
package Increment 1 (which was to be supported primarily
by the RMS) in a representative operational scenario. The
analysis develops discrete event simulation models for
both the MCM-1 Avenger and the LCS and identifies the
performance characteristics of each system that have the
largest impact on operational effectiveness. While acquisi-
tion of the RMS is no longer planned, this analysis sup-
ports potential future decision making by explicitly
comparing legacy (MCM-1 Avenger) and future (LCS
supported by an RMS like system) assets and also intro-
duces the possibility of utilizing existing systems (in this
case the Mk-18 Mod 2 Unmanned Underwater Vehicle
(UUV)) as an alternative MCM asset to the RMS while
corrections are made to the technological readiness of
dedicated LCS based MCM systems.
2. Overview
2.1. Architectural description
Before developing an operational simulation model of
MCM operations, both the MCM-1 Avenger and the LCS
(utilizing the RMS and Mk-18 Mod 2) are described per
the architectural view approach outlined in Maier and
Rechtin.4 Note that this work expands architectural
descriptions developed in Becker et al.5 and Beery.6 First,
the systems are described in terms of the functions that
must be performed in a functional architecture.
Subsequently, the systems are described in terms of the
physical components that define each system. This serves
as the basis for the development of the simulation model,
where the functions define the events that occur within the
model and the physical components describe the entities
that are represented in the model.
2.2. Architectural focus
The complete architecture focused on the full range of
mine warfare operations, including mining operations,
offensive MCM operations, and passive defensive MCM
operations.5 In the interest of brevity, the architecture
views presented in this paper will focus exclusively on
active defensive MCM operations, specifically functions
that relate to either minehunting or mine neutralization.
While minesweeping functions may also be classified as
part of active defensive MCM operations the minesweep-
ing capability of the LCS is not expected to be delivered
as a part of Increment 1 of the MCM mission package.7
Therefore, minesweeping was not included when model-
ing the architecture in order to facilitate a fairer compari-
son between the MCM-1 Avenger and the LCS (utilizing
either a RMS-like system or the Mk-18 Mod 2).
3. Functional architecture
3.1. Concept of operation
To scope model development and analysis a notional con-
cept of operation was developed through discussion with
MCM subject matter experts. The concept of operation
was kept as broad as possible to facilitate easy comparison
between the systems of interest. Figure 1 presents a visual
representation of the scenario of interest. The scenario
assumes that a minefield of 10 nautical miles by 10 nauti-
cal miles exists. The minefield is populated by 500 poten-
tial mines, 100 of which are actual mines. The MCM asset
(either the MCM-1 Avenger or the LCS) must transit to
the minefield and conduct the full sequence of mine coun-
termeasures operations, from mine detection through mine
neutralization.
3.2. Functional architecture diagrams
As discussed, the functional architecture was restricted to
the operations associated with minehunting and mine neu-
tralization. However, development of a comprehensive
architecture called out several other modeling considera-
tions. Figure 2 provides a high level overview of Active
Defensive MCM Operations as a UML Action Diagram.
Note that, while the core sequence of Minehunting and
Mine Neutralization is represented, there is also the need
to represent control of the operation to account for asset
availability as well as a logistics operation to conduct data
analysis and populate Post Mission Analysis (PMA) data,
which is used in support of Mine Neutralization activities.
As previously discussed, minesweeping was not included
when modeling the architecture so is shown in red in
Figure 2.
Minehunting is the first major portion of the Active
Defensive MCM simulation model. Figure 3 presents a
breakdown (again using a UML Action Diagram) of the
activities associated with Minehunting and one of the
associated sub-activities, Mine Detection (Figure 3 utilizes
several acronyms to reduce space and improve clarity, in
particular Mine-Like Echoes (MILECs), Mine-Like
2 Journal of Defense Modeling and Simulation: Applications, Methodology, Technology 00(0)
Contacts (MILCOs) and Non-Mine Bottom Objects
(NOMBOs)).
Simultaneous consideration of Figures 2 and 3 provides
additional clarity regarding the activities that should be
represented in a model of Active Defensive MCM
Operations. The process begins with Minehunting
Operations, which, as shown in Figure 3, is defined by a
linear sequence of Mine Detection, Classification,
Reacquisition, and Identification. Each activity is com-
pleted similarly to the Mine Detection sequence shown in
Figure 3, a loop based on the number of tracks that the
system will conduct through the minefield and the number
of potential mines is conducted within which the system
transits, conducts the relevant activity (Detect Mines in
Figure 3) and recovers gear. The completion of this
sequence populates a list of MILCOs as well as Post
Mission Analysis (PMA) data to be utilized by the Mine
Neutralization activity. Mine Neutralization then occurs,
where MILCOs are prosecuted and converted to
Neutralized Mines (any non-Neutralized Mines are
returned to the Minehunting Sequence and the process is
repeated). The definition of the sequence of activities asso-
ciated with Active Defense MCM Operations prompts the
definition of the set of physical components required to
perform those activities in the form of a physical
architecture.
4. Physical architecture
The purpose of this analysis is to compare the operational
performance of the MCM-1 Avenger and the LCS MCM
Mission Package. Accordingly, a complete physical archi-
tecture is created that defines the subsystems associated
with each of those alternatives (Figure 4).
4.1. Description of MCM-1 alternative
The subsystems used in the MCM-1 Avenger alternative
are shown on the right side of Figure 4. Note that several
subsystems are shown in red; these subsystems are utilized
in support of minesweeping operations, which were
Figure 1. Scenario overview.
Figure 2. Active defensive MCM operations as UML action diagram.
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previously scoped out of this analysis. The relevant sub-
systems that must be represented in the Active Defensive
MCM Operations utilizing the MCM-1 Avenger are the
MH-53E, which is comprised of the AN/AQS-24A (used
for airborne minehunting) as well as the MH-53E variant
of the SeaFox (used for airborne mine neutralization). The
model must also include the AN/SQQ-32 (used for surface
mine detection and classification) as well as the AN/SLQ-
48 (used for surface mine identification and neutraliza-
tion). Note that there are two subsystems that can perform
each major function associated with Active Defensive
MCM Operations (mine detection, classification, identifi-
cation, and neutralization). This is unique to the MCM-1
Avenger alternative, there are surface and airborne assets
that can perform each major function, the implementation
will be discussed in more detail in the description of the
MCM-1 model.
4.2. Description of LCS alternative
The subsystems used in the LCS MCM alternative are
shown on the left side of Figure 4. Again, the model does
not assess minesweeping capability and accordingly the
subsystems used for minesweeping are colored red. As
with the MCM-1 Avenger configurations, the LCS utilizes
a mix of airborne and surface assets; however, there is no
overlap in capability. The Remote Multi-Mission Vehicle
(RMMV) is a surface asset that performs mine detection
and classification while the MH-60S (supported by the
AMDS and the Archerfish) performs mine identification
and neutralization. This alternative operational concept
will be discussed in detail in the description of the LCS
model.
5. Model presentation
5.1. MCM-1 model description
A discrete event simulation was built in ExtendSim, cre-
ated by Imagine That Inc., to facilitate operational effec-
tiveness analysis of the MCM-1 Avenger and LCS. A full
version of the model can be obtained from the correspond-
ing author, additional detail may also be found in Beery.6
The MCM-1 Avenger subsystems include airborne and
surface assets, both of which can perform the full
sequence of mine detection through mine neutralization.
Accordingly, a model was developed that partitioned the
potential minefield into two zones (the ratio of the size of
the zones will be included as an input variable in the simu-
lation). The first zone is addressed by the MCM-1
Avenger, which explores the zone using parallel tracks
(the track spacing will also be included as an input vari-
able in the simulation). The MCM-1 Avenger uses the
AN/SQQ-32 for mine detection and classification and uses
the AN/ALQ-8 for mine identification and neutralization,
enabling it to conduct the complete sequence of mine
detection through neutralization for each potential mine in
the zone. The second zone is addressed by the MH-53E,
which also explores the area along parallel tracks. The
MH-53E uses the AN/AQS-24A to perform mine detec-
tion and classification. The MH-53E conducts detection
and classification for each potential mine in the zone and
populates a list of mine-like contacts (MILCOs) which
must be reacquired separately for identification and
Figure 3. Minehunting operations as UML action diagram.
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neutralization (note that the MH-53E cannot utilize the
AN/AQS-24A and the SeaFox simultaneously, therefore
the entire area must be searched using the AN/AQS-24A
before the MH-53E is fitted with the SeaFox to proceed
through neutralization). A visual representation of this
operation is shown in Figure 5.
Note that Figure 5 utilizes red dots in the bottom por-
tion of the minefield to represent potential mines that are
detected, classified, identified, and neutralized by the
MCM-1 Avenger, and white dots in the top portion of the
minefield to represent potential mines that are detected
and classified by the MH-53E. Note that each system is
characterized by a maximum sortie time (another input
variable), which may force the system to return to a sta-
ging area (the distance from the minefield to the staging
area is also an input variable). After the MCM-1 Avenger
and the MH-53E have concluded this portion of the opera-
tion, a dedicated reacquisition, identification, and neutrali-
zation sequence is initiated for the top portion (MH-53E
portion) on the minefield. This zone is segmented (the seg-
mentation percentage is another input variable) and both
the MCM-1 Avenger and the MH-53E (now equipped
with the SeaFox) re-enter the top zone of the minefield
and proceed through neutralization for each MILCO in the
zone. A traveling salesman problem using a nearest neigh-
bor algorithm is created to determine the order in which
each MILCO is prosecuted. Given that the time required
for reacquisition, identification, and neutralization are
variables included in the model, the number of MILCOs
that may be reached during each sortie is unknown at the
beginning of each sortie. Given that uncertainty, the near-
est neighbor algorithm is used to provide a realistic solu-
tion. If a system is required to leave the minefield and
return to the staging area, the traveling salesman problem
is re-solved. The algorithm terminates when the last mine
is neutralized. Figure 6 presents a visual representation of
this portion of the operation.
The simulation model terminates after the final poten-
tial mine has been prosecuted. The model records the
number of mines that have been successfully detected,
classified, identified, and neutralized as well as the dura-
tion of the operation.
5.2. LCS model description
Representation of the LCS MCM mission package within
the modeling software required the creation of a second
model to properly represent the new physical components.
Most notable, mine detection and classification are con-
ducted exclusively by the RMMV, after which mines are
reacquired for identification and neutralization by an MH-
60S (which utilizes Archerfish). Accordingly, the model
represents the RMMV very similarly to the MH-53E’s
detection and classification sequence in the MCM-1
Avenger alternative model (both systems conduct parallel
tracks of mine detection and classification). The model
then represents the MH-60S very similarly to the MH-
53E’s reacquisition, identification, and neutralization
sequence in the MCM-1 Avenger alternative model (both
systems proceed to MILCOs by solving a traveling sales-
man problem). As a result, while there are substantial tech-
nical and operational challenges associated with the
implementation of the LCS MCM mission package sub-
systems, the development of the operational model is actu-
ally far simpler. Figure 7 presents a visual representation
Figure 4. MCM system physical component hierarchy.
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of the full sequence of mine detection through neutraliza-
tion for the LCS alternative.
While Figures 5 to 7 present useful visual representa-
tions of the operational concepts employed by the legacy
and future MCM systems, it is useful to provide additional
detail regarding the actual model implementation of the
MCM operation. Figures 5 to 7 suggest that the model
may be map- or physics-based, which is not the case.
Rather, the entities within the simulation are the actual
mines that are processed by each subsystem (and associ-
ated server or activity within the discrete event simula-
tion). Each potential mine is created within the model, and
assigned a random x and y coordinate using a uniform dis-
tribution per the upper and lower bounds shown in Figure
7. Each mine is then assigned attribute values that define
the characteristics of the MCM systems (such as the prob-
ability of detection, recovery time, etc.) that are used for
each event the mine experiences within the model. The
mines are then sorted based on their x-coordinate values
and each mine experiences a slight delay, ensuring that the
mines pass through the simulation in ascending order of
their x-coordinate values. The mines are then sorted into
two groups according to their y-coordinate values and
assigned to a particular MCM system for the minehunting
Figure 5. Detection and classification: MCM-1 configurations.
Figure 6. Identification and neutralization: MCM-1 configurations.
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sequence. The mines are then sorted again based on their
y-coordinate values to determine whether or not each mine
is within the range of a particular pass through the mine-
field. Those mines that are not in the range of that pass
loop around and wait for the end of the current pass. Those
mines that are in range of the system for a given minefield
pass experience delays for system transit, streaming of
MCM equipment, search, and recovery of MCM equip-
ment. An if-then statement using a random real number
between 0 and 1 is generated and compared with the prob-
ability of detection for each system to determine whether
or not the mine is successfully detected. A similar process
is employed for mine classification. As with the MCM-1
systems, for mine reacquisition, identification, and neutra-
lization a more detailed nearest neighbor algorithm for sys-
tem transit is used to ensure that the delay is a function of
the distance between the mines (rather than a pre-defined
track cutting through the minefield).
5.3. Variable summary and experimental design
As discussed in previous sections, a number of variables
are necessary to define both the minefield and the MCM
systems of interest. Due to the differences between the
MCM-1 Avenger model and the LCS model, the number
of input variables used in each model is actually different
(51 variables for the MCM-1 Avenger model and 32 vari-
ables for the LCS model). This difference is due to the
need to define probability of detection, classification, reac-
quisition, identification, and neutralization for both
airborne and surface assets in the MCM-1 Avenger model
whereas the LCS model only requires probabilities of
detection and classification for surface assets and probabil-
ities of reacquisition, identification, and neutralization for
airborne assets due to the differences in operational con-
cept. Note that the full sequence of detection through neu-
tralization must be conducted by each system (LCS and
MCM-1) but the LCS configuration utilizes fewer systems
to conduct that sequence (the systems varied in the MCM-
1 configurations that are not included in the LCS config-
urations are denoted by a N/A in Figure 9).
Figures 8 and 9 provide an overview of the full list of
variables examined in each model. The variables have
been grouped into surface variables (blue), airborne vari-
ables (red), and operational and environmental variables
(green) to aid organization. Note that several variables are
also denoted with an asterisk, these correspond to variables
that can only take discrete values, all other variables are
continuous. A 512 design point nearly orthogonal/nearly
balanced design (available at harvest.nps.edu) was selected
to ensure minimal correlation between input variables and
minimal imbalance between levels of the discrete factors.
Each design point was replicated 30 times to account for
the stochastic nature of the simulation.
6. Model analysis
One goal of this research is to compare to operational per-
formance of the MCM-1 Avenger and the LCS in Active
Defensive MCM operations. Accordingly, a consistent set
Figure 7. Detection-neutralization sequence: LCS configurations.
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of measures of effectiveness (MOEs) were used to assess
performance in each model. The two MOEs used in this
analysis are:
1. Percent Mine Clearance
2. Area Coverage Rate Sustained
The percent mine clearance is an intuitive metric, calcu-
lated as the percentage of the mines in each scenario
that are successfully neutralized. The second MOE, the
Area Coverage Rate Sustained (ACRS) requires some
additional explanation. ACRS is a traditionally used
metric in the mine warfare community, and is therefore
included in this analysis. It is calculated per Naval
Warfare Publication 3-15.8
Regression analysis was conducted to determine the
input variables that had the largest impact on each MOE
for each MCM configuration. The results of that regres-
sion for the Percent Mine Clearance are presented in
Figures 10 and 11. Figure 10 presents the analysis results
for the MCM-1 Configurations, and Figure 11 presents the
analysis results for the LCS Configurations. Each figure
includes both summary of fit and analysis of variance out-
put (to include r-square values) as well actual by predicted
plots to assess the quality of the model fit as well as the
appropriateness of regression analysis. Each figure also
includes a sorted effect summary to identify statistically
significant variables.
Regression diagnostics suggest that the model fit is
acceptable. Note that, with some exceptions for the order-
ing of the variables, the variables that have the most sub-
stantial impact for both systems are the same (the most
significant variables are the probabilities of detection, clas-
sification, reacquisition, identification, and neutralization
as well as the number of passes that each system conducts
in the minefield). Further, recall that the simulation varied
the probabilities of classification, identification, and reac-
quisition for actual mines as well as non-mines. Note that
the performance of each system for actual mines was iden-
tified as significant, whereas the performance for non-
mines was not identified as significant (suggesting that
investment for reducing false negatives is more important
than for reducing false positives). Finally, the average per-
cent clearance for both the MCM-1 and LCS configura-
tions was approximately 42%, suggesting that both the
legacy and replacement systems provided approximately
equivalent operational performance in terms of mine clear-
ance. Note that this is likely a function of the implementa-
tion of the model (the systems were permitted to continue
the operation until all potential mines were assessed) as
well as the system performance characteristics described
in Figures 8 and 9, which are varied between the same val-
ues for both the LCS and MCM-1 systems.
A similar analysis approach was employed for the
ACRS; the results of that analysis are presented in Figures
12 and 13. Figure 12 presents the analysis results for the
MCM-1 Configurations, and Figure 13 presents the analy-
sis results for the LCS Configurations.
Regression diagnostics suggest that the model fit is
acceptable. Once again, the LCS provided approximately
equivalent performance to the MCM-1 Avenger (the
ACRS was approximately 0.22 for the LCS Configurations
compared with 0.20 for the MCM-1 Avenger
Configurations). Notably, the variables that had the most
substantial impact for the LCS Configurations were differ-
ent than the variables that had the most substantial impact
for the MCM-1 Configurations. While the performance of
each system was impacted by the number of passes that
each system makes through the minefield as well as the
system search speed, the MCM-1 Avenger’s performance
was also impacted by the percentage of the minefield
searched by surface assets (suggesting that performance is
improved when the MCM-1 Avenger searches a larger
portion of the minefield than the MH-53E). The ACRS for
the LCS Configurations was significantly impacted by the
sortie time, suggesting that the endurance of the RMS
(along with the aforementioned search speed) should be
the primary area of investment for future investigations.
7. Mk-18 Mod 2 model analysis
Recall that the performance of the LCS Configurations
(supported by the now cancelled RMS) was approximately
equivalent to the performance of the MCM-1
Configurations for each MOE. To investigate the potential
improvement to operational performance that may be rea-
lized through the utilization of an alternative system, the
model was subsequently modified to consider an alterna-
tive Minehunting platform (the Mk-18 Mod 2 rather than
the RMS). The Mk-18 Mod 2 UUV currently employed
by U.S. Navy 5th fleet in support of MCM operations.9
Due to the similar operational implementation strategy
between the Mk-18 Mod 2 and the RMS, the simulation
model described in Section 5 of this paper for the LCS
Configurations was modified to simulate the use of the
Mk-18 Mod 2. The only major modification to the simula-
tion model was the incorporation of multiple Mk-18
Mod 2 systems conducting minehunting activities simulta-
neously (the previous model assumed that only a single
RMS system was employed at a time). The model was
modified to allow for 1-12 Mk-18 Mod 2s conducting
minehunting simultaneously. The systems divided the area
at the onset of the operation, with no overlap between
areas (ex: if two systems were modeled, each system
searched a 5 x 10 nm area; if three systems were modeled,
each system searched a 3.33 x 10 nm area; etc.). The
8 Journal of Defense Modeling and Simulation: Applications, Methodology, Technology 00(0)
simulation assumed that a group of Rigid-Hulled
Inflatable Boats, each holding up to two Mk-18 Mod 2s,
deployed from the LCS and transited to the edge of the
minefield to deploy the Mk-18 Mod 2s.
The MCM-1 Avenger and LCS (supported by the
RMS) model data was reused, and the results were com-
pared with the modified model incorporating the Mc18
Mod 2. The MCM-1 Avenger Configurations achieved an
ACRS average of 5.38 and the LCS (supported by the
RMS) Configurations achieved an ACRS average of 4.95.
The simulation model was replicated 30 times for each
Mk-18 Mod 2 Configuration, and an average ACRS was
calculated for each configuration. Figure 14 presents a gra-
phical comparison of the ACRS values for the MCM-1
Avenger Configurations, LCS (supported by the RMS)
Configurations, and 12 different Mk-18 Mod 2
Configurations.
Note that a single Mk-18 Mod 2 is incapable of replicat-
ing the operational performance of either the MCM-1
Avenger or the RMS. Similarly, two Mk-18 Mod 2s do not
provide equivalent performance to either alternative sys-
tem. However, utilization of three Mk-18 Mod 2s provides
Figure 8. Input variable summary: MCM-1 configurations.
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approximately equivalent performance, utilization of four
Mk-18 Mod 2s provides superior performance. Additional
ACRS performance is realized with the addition of each
subsequent Mk-18 Mod 2 in the model. Given that the Mk-
18 Mod 2 has been successfully utilized in 5th fleet to sup-
port MCM operations, this analysis can inform the appro-
priate number of systems to be used in each operational
scenario, with due consideration for maintenance and fail-
ures. Recall that this analysis focused specifically on a 100
square nautical mile scenario and alterations to the
scenario of interest will alter the recommendations regard-
ing the appropriate number of Mk-18 Mod 2 systems.
8. Recommendations, conclusions, and
future work
This paper presented a comparative analysis of legacy
(MCM-1 Avenger), planned (LCS supported by RMS),
and potential (LCS supported by Mk-18 Mod2) MCM sys-
tems. This analysis was realized through development of
Figure 9. Input variable summary: LCS configurations.
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Figure 11. Percent mine clearance regression results: LCS configurations.
Figure 10. Percent mine clearance regression results: MCM-1 configurations.
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Figure 12. ACRS regression results: MCM-1 configurations.
Figure 13. ACRS regression results: LCS configurations.
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descriptive architecture products and associated discrete
event simulation models. Analysis of those simulation
models suggested three actionable conclusions. First, if the
RMS component of the LCS MCM mission package was
capable of operating at, or around, planned capabilities in
terms of detection, classification, identification, and neu-
tralization probabilities, it would be capable of replicating
the performance of the MCM-1 Avenger in terms of mine
clearance percentage as well as ACRS. Second, technolo-
gical improvements to the MCM-1 Avenger should focus
on improvements to those same characteristics, with
particular focus on a reduction to false negatives rather
than false positives. Third, if the Mk-18 Mod 2 is to be used
as a temporary stopgap for MCM operations, a minimum of
four systems must be utilized simultaneously to provide
equivalent operational performance to the MCM-1 Avenger.
There are numerous opportunities for expansion of this
research. In particular, the physics of each event could be
improved within the existing simulation. This would be
particularly important if a more detailed analysis of target
values for probabilities of detection, classification, identifi-
cation, and neutralization was conducted using this (or any
similar) model. Second, a more detailed analysis of the
consequences of utilizing Mk-18 Mod 2s as a replacement
for the RMS should consider the operational consequences
of deploying and recovering a potentially large number of
systems. The development and analysis of a detailed cost
model could also support the introduction of additional
constraints that could better inform the number of Mk-18
Mod 2 systems that can realistically be employed in each
operational scenario. Finally, a more detailed analysis of a
notional Mk-18 Mod 3 (or similar) system could be con-
ducted to identify target values for the probabilities of
detection and classification, as well as endurance or speed.
This research group, in coordination with the Consortium
for Robotics and Unmanned Systems Education and
Research at the Naval Postgraduate School, is currently
engaged into several related studies considering the future
of unmanned autonomous systems for MIW operations.
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